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MODIFICATION OF CONSENT DECREES: A PROPOSAL
TO THE ANTITRUST DIVISION

Victor H. Kramer*

T

HE genius of the Sherman Act has been said to lie in its generality and adaptability. 1 Thus the act has been successfully
applied for almost three-quarters of a century to an economy that
has been more dynamic than during any comparable period in
history.
In 1912, twenty-two years after passage of the act, consent decrees began to be frequently used as a means of settling, without
trial, civil antitrust suits brought by the govemment.2 Their use
became even more popular as a result of the passage in 1914 of
section 5 of the Clayton Act.3 It permitted private plaintiffs seeking triple damages for alleged antitrust injuries to use final judg-

•Member of the District of Columbia and Ohio bars; formerly Chief, General Litigation Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.-Ed. ·
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §1. See Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 at 359 (1933).
2 The first consent decree entered in a civil Sherman Act case instituted by the United
States was that in United States v. Otis Elevator Co. on June 1, 1906. See CCH, THE
FEDERAL ANTITRusr LAws, p. 75, #30 (1952). Until 1912, only two other consent decrees
were entered: United States v. American Seating Co. in 1907 (id. at 78, #45) and United
States v. Southern Wholesale Grocers' Assn. (id. at 84, #72). In 1912, four consent decrees
were entered: United States v. Standard Wood Co. (id. at 90, #94); United States v.
Pacific Coast Plumbing Supply Assn. (id. at 93, #104); United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America (id at 96, #116); and United States v. Central-West Publishing Co. (id. at 97,
#119). In 1913, six consent decrees were entered-five of them in the final month of the
Taft Administration: United States v. Master Horseshoers' Nat. Protective Assn. (id. at
98, #123); United States v. Philadelphia Jobbing Confectioners' Assn. (id. at 98, #124);
United States v. K.rentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co. (id. at 99, #129); United States v.
Burroughs Adding Machine Co. (id. at 101, #138); United States v. New Departure Mfg.
Co. (id. at 102, #141).
3 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §16.
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ments in antitrust cases instituted by the government as "prima
facie evidence . . . as to all matters respecting which said judgment of decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto." But the section contained a proviso that it should "not apply to consent· judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken." The effect of this proviso was to give defendants in antitrust cases a real incentive to compose their difficulties with the government.
There have been about 410 civil cases filed by the United
States under the Sherman Act terminated by the filing of consent
judgments and about one-fourth of these judgments have been
on the books for more than a quarter of a century.4 The injunctive provisions in these judgments apply in perpetuity unless
expressly limited by their terms to some specific period. Consequently, unless the defendants have died or gone out of business,
leaving no successor, almost all of these judgments are still in
effect.5 These decrees relate to products as diverse as quinine
and peanuts. 6 They apply to businesses as large as General Motors
Corporation and as small as the members of the Library Binding
Institute in New York City.7 Their provisions are frequently
minute, particularized and carefully tailored to outlaw the specific anti-competitive practices engaged in by the defendants at
the time when the decrees were entered. Some of them outlaw activities that do not remotely violate the antitrust laws.8 The prohibitions were deemed necessary when the judgment was entered

4 The number entered from 1890 through 1956 was obtained from a count of the
cases listed in CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (1952) and (1952-1956 Supp.). The
number entered in 1957 (22) was obtained directly from the Antitrust Division. When
separate consent decrees were entered against more than one defendant in a single case,
they are nevertheless counted as one decree. And see note 5 infra.
5 A very few consent decrees, however, have been terminated. For example, the consent
decree entered in 1929 in United States v. General Outdoor Advertising Co. [CCH, THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, p. 152, #346 (1952)) was terminated after entry of the consent
decree against the same defendant in 1955 [id., 1952-1956 Supp., p. 54, #1058]. Similarly,
Article IX of the consent judgment in United States v. Textile Refinishers Assn., Inc.,
(CCH TRADE CAS. 1955, 1J68,126) terminated an earlier consent decree against the same
defendant. See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, p. 172, #414 (1952). A consent judgment in United States v. Gamewell Co. (id. at 346, #874) has been suspended for a
three-year period (unreported).
6 United States v. Amsterdamsche Chininefabriek (quinine), CCH, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS, p. 150, #337 (1952); United States v. Nat. Peanut Cleaners &: Shellers
Assn., id. at 140, #294.
7 United States v. General Motors Corp., CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUst LAws, p. 31,
#566 (1952-1956 Supp.); United States v. Library Binding Institute, id. at 59, #1081.
s E.g., see discussion of the Swift and Harvester decrees, at notes 14 and 34 infra.
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to dissipate the effects of defendant's unlawful conduct or to insure against its renewal or continuation.
All antitrust consent decrees-at least all those entered in the
past twenty years-contain a so-called retention-of-jurisdiction
provision, along the following lines:
Jurisdiction is retained for the purpose of enabling any
of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court .
at any time for such further orders and directions as may be
necessary or appropriate for the construction or carrying out
of this Final Judgment, for the modification or termination
of any of the provisions herein and for the enforcement of
compliance therewith and punishment of violations therof.
This provision, while it is frequently cited by courts as the
source of their power to modify or terminate judgments,° is probably surplusage. The general rule appears to be that courts have
inherent power to modify and enforce their judgments.10 Moreover, they have the power to terminate them, 11 although in recent
years the Antitrust Division has attempted to eliminate the phrase
"or ttrmination" in the retention-of-jurisdiction provision.
The standard to be applied in determining whether a defendant should be "relieved" from a final judgment is formulated in
clause (5) of rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended in 1948.12 That clause permits a court on motion to
"relieve a party or his legal representative" from any final judgment if it "is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application." It appears that amended rule 60(b)
applies to judgments entered before, as well as after 1948, "unless
it 'would work injustice' so to apply the rule." 13
The generality of rule 60(b)(5) offers little guidance in determining the circumstances under which an antitrust consent
decree may be modified. The Department of Justice has taken the
position that the tests for modifying a consent judgment, at least

9 See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 at 463-464
(1957); Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 at 562 (1942).
10 See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 at 114 (1932), and United States v.
California Co-Operative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 (1929).
11 See Tobin v. Alma Mills, (4th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 133.
12 28 U.S.C. (1952) §723(c). We are not here concerned with relief from judgments
entered by mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, fraud, misrepresentation or
on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Rule 60(b) provides that relief sought on
these grounds must be requested not more than a year after the entry of the judgment.
13 See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 at 609 (1949).
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on the petition of a defendant, are different from those to be applied in cases involving litigated judgments.14 There is no unequivocal authority to support the· department's position. The
leading case is United States v. Swift & Co.15 It grew out of an
antitrust consent decree entered into by the government in February 1920 with the then five largest meat packers.16 Among other
things the decree prevented the defendants from selling or distributing groceries and other non-meat products or from operating retail meat stores. 17 A few years later the operation of the decree was suspended.18 In 1928, the Supreme Court finally held
the consent decree valid and enforceable.19 In· 1930, Swift and
Armour filed petitions to modify the consent decree by eliminating the injunctions against their entry into the grocery business
and in other significant respects. The trial court granted the petitions for modification so as to permit sales of groceries at wholesale but denied the prayers for permission to enter the retail
food business.20 The United States appealed to the Supreme
Court, which reversed in an opinion by Justice Cardozo. Although the decision was by only four justices with two dissenting
and three not participating, it has acquired great authority with
the passing of years, having been cited in well over a hundred
judicial opinions.
Cardozo's discussion of the law on modification of equity decrees commenced with the point that the same tests apply to litigated judgments as to those entered by consent of the parties.
He said:
"The result is all one whether the decree has been entered
after litigation or by consent. American Press Assn. v. United
States, 245 Fed. 91. In either event, a court does not abdicate
its power to revoke or modify its mandate if satisfied that
what it has been doing has been turned through changing
circumstances into an instrument of wrong. We reject the
argument . . . that a decree entered upon consent is to be
treated as a contract and not as a judicial act."21
14See Brief for the United States in support of Motion for Summary Judgment in
United States v. Swift & Co., filed Sept. 9, 1957, pp. 5-6. See text at note 44 infra.
15 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
16 See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUsr LAWS, p. 118, #211 (1952).
17 See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 at 328-329 (1928).
18 See United States v. California Co-Operative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 at 555 (1929).
10 Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928).
20See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 at 113-114 (1932).
21 Id. at 114-115.
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Five pages later he seems to reverse himself and hold that a
much stricter test is to be applied to petitions to modify consent
decrees. He said:
"Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked
by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change
what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of
all concerned."
There are practical problems facing the court and the parties
when a consent decree is sought to be modified that are not present when modification is sought of a judgment after trial. In consent decrees there is no record available to which the court may
turn for guidance on market structure, competitive conditions
and industry practices. There is no judicial opinion available to
explain the reasons why any particular provision of the decree
was adopted. There are no findings of fact to serve as a foundation for the relief granted. It is, therefore, necessary for a court,
in passing upon a motion to modify or vacate an antitrust consent
judgment, to try some or all of the very issues the trial of which
was obviated by the entry of the decree on consent. This consideration was emphasized by Justice Cardozo in the closing sentence of his opinion: "What was then solemnly adjudged as a
final composition of an historic litigation will not lightly be undone at the suit of the offenders, and the composition held for
nothing." 22
The few opinions in the decided cases23 suggest the following

22 Id. at 120.
23 The following

is a list of all reported judicial opinions found by the writer, passing
on petitions or motions by defendants to modify or vacate final decrees or judgments in
cases brought by the United States under the Sherman Act:

Applications granted
1. United States v. E. I. du Pont De Nemours &: Co., (D.C. Del. 1921) 273 F. 869

(litigated decree).
2. American Press Assn. v. United States, (7th Cir. 1917) 245 F. 91 (consent decree).
3. United States v. International Salt Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1948) CCH 1948-1949 TRADE
CAS., 1[62,270 (litigated judgment) (granted in part and denied in part).
4. United States v. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 356
(litigated judgment).

Applications denied
1. United States v. Discher, (S.D. N.Y. 1919) 255 F. 719 (consent decree).

2. United States v. New England Fish Exchange, (D.C. Mass. 1923) 292 F. 511 (litigated
decree).
3. United States v. Swift &: Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932) (consent decree).
4. United States v. Tanner Products Co., (N.D. Ill. 1933) CCH TRADE REG. CT. DEC.
Supp. 1932-1939, 1[55,037 (consent decree).
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generalization: except where the government consents, a provision in a judgment in an antitrust case filed by the United States
imposing continuing injunctions will be terminated by the court
only upon a showing by the defendant that (1) the conditions giving rise to the injunction have substantially changed; (2) it is
clear that the injunction is no longer necessary to obtain defendant's obedience to law; and (3) the injunction constitutes a serious
handicap to the defendant. While it may be more difficult for a
defendant to obtain a modification of a consent decree than of
one entered after trial, the circumstances under which modification will be granted should remain the same in both situations.
But a defendant may properly be required to sustain a heavier
burden of proof in establishing that the circumstances justifying
modification in fact are present.
Thus far we have been considering cases where a defendant
seeks to modify or vacate· an antitrust judgment. What is the situation when the shoe is on the other foot and the government is
the petitioner? Only once has the United States been successful
in obtaining modification of an antitrust judgment over defend-

5. United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., (D.C. Del. 1945) 61 F. Supp. 656 (litigated
judgment). See also (D.C. Del. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 297.
6. United States v. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1951) CCH 1950-1951
TRADE CAs. ff62,795 (litigated judgment).
7. United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., (W.D. N.Y. 1954) CCH 1954 TRADE
CAS. ffff67,848 and 67,902 (litigated judgment). See also (W.D. N.Y. 1952) CCH 1952-1953
TRADE CAs. ff67,237.
8. United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., (E.D. Mich. 1954) 125 F. Supp. 710 (litigated
judgment).
See also Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178 at 184 (1948); Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 at 298 (1941); Franke v. Wiltschek, (2d Cir.
1953) 209 F. (2d) 493 at 498, n. 3; Western Union Tel. Co. v. International Brotherhood,
(7th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 955; Bigelow v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., (7th Cir.
1950) 183 F. (2d) 60 at 62; Bigelow v. Balaban &: Katz Corp., (7th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d)
794 at 797; Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., (10th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 788.
For decisions in cases involving analogous issues under cease and desist orders issued
by the Federal Trade Commission, see Indiana Quartered Oak Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1932)
58 F. (2d) 182; Century Metalcraft Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 443; American Chain &: Cable Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 909.
The following two cases each involved petitions to terminate injunctions against
violating the Fair Labor Standards Act [52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §201]: Tobin
v. Alma Mills, (W.D. S.C. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 728, revd. (4th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 133
(consent decree entered in 1940 dissolved on ground that defendant "has observed the
provisions of the statute in good faith over a period of ten years and there is no present
reason to apprehend violation by him" and (at 136) "injunction was hampering the owners
of the company in disposing of their stock"); Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., (E.D. Wis.
1956) 142 F. Supp. 202, affd. (7th Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 712 (motion to vacate injunction
entered in 1944 denied where 1based on contention that judgment was inequitable under
rule 60(b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. and not on the basis of changed conditions).

1958]

CONSENT DECREES

1057

ant's opposition: Chrysler Corporation v. United St(Ztes.24 Even
then, only four justices voted in favor of upholding the modification allowed by the district court.25 Chrysler, in 1938, had
consented to a decree which contained an injunction prohibiting
it from affiliating with an automobile finance company. The decree contained a proviso that this injunction would be lifted if
by January 1, 1941 a final order had not been obtained requiring
General Motors to divest itself of its wholly-owned automobile
finance company. The specified date arrived and no such order
had been obtained. The government moved for and obtained
modification of the decree extending the date for one year.26 Another year passed and no relief had been obtained against General Motors. Again the government applied for and obtained
from the district court a second one-year extension. Chrysler
appealed to the Supreme Court. Justice Black, for the Court,
stated that "the test to be applied" is "whether the change served
to effectuate or to thwart the basic purpose of the original consent decree." 27 He then proceeded to affirm the district court's
findings that the government had proceeded diligently in its suit
against General Motors, and that the requested modification
would not impose a serious burden on Chrysler. The majority
emphasized that Chrysler had made no showing that the modification would place it at a competitive disadvantage.
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, answered this conclusion, stating, "The burden obviously rested upon the Government to show
good cause for disregarding an express provision in a carefully
framed decree...." 28
Six years later, the Court had before it Ford's appeal from
an extension by the district court of a similar ban against affiliation with a finance company in a similar decree entered against
it. Again the decision of the Court was by four justices. This
time Justice Frankfurter was in the majority and wrote the
Court's opinion.29 The Court held that those circumstances in

24 316 U.S. 556
25 Chief Justice

(1942).
Stone and Justices Black, Douglas and Byrnes. Justices Roberts,
Murphy and Jackson took no part, and Justices Frankfurter and Reed dissented.
26 See Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 at 560 (1942). Chrysler had appealed to the Supreme Court from the first modification but the appeal was dismissed
for want of a quorum of qualified justices [314 U.S. 583 (1941), rehearing den. 314 U.S.
716 (1942)).
27 Id. at 562.
28 Id. at 570.
29 Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948). Justices Frankfurter and
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the Chrysler case which "were found extenuating on behalf of
the Government two years after the entry of the decree are hardly compelling ten years afterward," 30 and reversed the district
court's judgment modifying the decree.
Justice Black, in sharp dissent, charged that the Court treated
the consent decree "as though it were a contract between private
persons for purchase of an automobile." 31 He then cited the
Swift case as authority for the proposition that "a consent decree
is not a contract, but a judicial act."
The fact is that a consent decree has many elements of a contract. Perhaps a more accurate description would be that it is a
contract approved by a court. In an opinion handed down but
three months after the Supreme Court decision in the Chrysler
case, Judge Maris held that consent decrees are "based" on agreements "binding upon the government."32 In the RCA case the government had moved to dismiss the complaint and vacate the
consent decree entered ten years earlier on the ground that, in
the opinion of the Department of Justice, the decree no longer
promoted the public interest. In effect, it sought another chance
to obtain more effective relief in a new proceeding. Judge Maris,
in denying the government motion, stated:
"Since these consent decrees are based upon an agreement
made by the Attorney General which is binding upon the
Government the defendants are entitled to set them up as
a bar to any attempt by the Government to re-litigate the
issues raised in the suit or to seek relief with respect thereto
additional to that given by the consent decrees. Aluminum
Co. v. United States, 302 U.S. 230, 232 ... ; United States v.
International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 703 .... This is
a very real benefit of which they would be deprived were the
Government's motion to be granted." 33
In the International Haroester case, cited by Judge Maris, the
government had obtained a decision by a district court that the

Reed (the nvo dissenters in the Chrysler case) were joined by Chief Justice Vinson and
Justice Burton. Justices Murphy and Jackson took no part, and Justices Black, Douglas
and Rutledge dissented.
so Id. at 321.
at 322.
32 United States v. R.C.A., (D.C. Del. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 654 at 656. An appeal by
the United States was dismissed on its own motion [318 U.S. 796 (1943)].
33 Id. at 656.
31 Id.
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defendant was a combination in restraint of trade. 34 The district
court's decree entered in 1914 required that defendant be divided
into three companies. Subsequently, this decree was modified by
consent and the provision for mandatory dissolution eliminated.35 A further consent decree, entered after defendant had
dismissed its appeal to the Supreme Court,36 was entered in 1918.
The 1918 decree contained a clause providing that if "competitive conditions . . . in harvesting machines . . . shall not have
been established at the expiration of eighteen months after the
termination of the existing war ... the United States shall have
the right to such further relief herein as shall be necessary to restore said competitive conditions and to bring about a situation
. h armony w1.th Iaw...." 37
m
In 1923 the United States filed a supplemental petition to secure additional relief. 38 It argued that the purpose of the 1918
decree was to restore competitive conditions as they obtained
prior to the formation of the defendant in 1902 and that the decree had not accomplished that purpose. 30 On appeal from the
district court's denial of the supplemental petition, the Supreme
Court held that lawful "competitive conditions" had been established, though not those existing in 1902, and that to grant
further relief "would plainly be repugnant to the agreement approved by the court and embodied in the decree, which has become binding upon all parties, and upon which the International
Company has, in the exercise of good faith, been entitled to
rely." 40
The government learned from the Harvester case that the
privilege of having a try for a second bite is afforded only to those
who expressly and plainly reserve that privilege. And even that
reservation does not guarantee that the second bite will be very
nourishing. The second-bite privilege is written into some consent judgments in a provision that is popularly known as a "sword
of Damocles" clause. The term. perhaps was first applied to the
Flat Glass decree in 1948. That decree gives the United States at

34 United States v. International Harvester Co., (D.C. Minn. 1914) 214 F.
35 See United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 at 696
36 International Harvester Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 587 (1918).
37 Quoted in United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 at
38 See United States v. International Harvester Co., (D.C. Minn., undated)

987.
(1927).
697 (1927).
10 F. (2d)

827 at 828.
39 See United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 at 702 (1927).
40 Id. at 703.
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any time after three years from the date of the judgment the
privilege of filing a petition for dissolution of the principal defendants "without showing a change in circumstance."41 Since
Harvester, the government has never invoked this type of clause
to obtain additional relief.
The "precedent . . . of Damocles" was explicitly utilized by
Judge Wyzanski in his judgment in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp. 42 In his "Opinion on Remedy" Judge Wyzanski
frankly expressed his reluctance to proceed "with the surgical
ruthlessness that might commend itself to those seeking absolute assurance that there will be workable competition." He
therefore proposed first to try "milder remedies." But he ruled
that ten and a half years after termination of any appeal to the
Supreme Court "both parties shall report to this Court the effect
of this decree, and may then petition for its modification, in view
of its effect in establishing workable competition. If either party
takes advantage of this paragraph by filing a petition, each such
petition shall be accompanied by affidavits setting forth the then
structure of the shoe machinery market and defendant's power
within that market." 48
Judge Wyzanski's "C Day" provisions evidence an apparent desire .by the court for a thorough-going re-evaluation of the effect
of the decree some twelve years after he filed his opinion. At that
time either party may petition for its modification. For example,
defendant could ask that the compulsory machinery-sale provisions-the heart of the decree-be lifted. And the government
could ask for more drastic relief such as for abolition of the leasing system altogether.
We must wait until 1965 or later to assay the wisdom of Judge
Wyzanski's "C Day." We hazard the guess that much will depend
upon whether the judge himself is then sitting in the District of
Massachusetts. But surely "C Day" points in the right direction
and suggests a principle which might well be adapted by the
Antitrust Division for use in most, if not all, its consent judgments.
In two relatively recent litigated judgments entered in the
Southern District of New York in important government anti-

41 United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., (N.D. Ohio 1948) CCH 1948-1949
TRADE CAS. 1[62,323, Art. XXIX.
42 (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 295 at 351, affd. per curiam 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
48 Arts. 1 and 18 (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 295 at 352 and 354.
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trust cases, the government was given the privilege of petitioning
for "additional" relief during a five-y<:;ar period following the
entry of the judgment.44 In both cases at the expiration of the
five-year period, the government, instead of asking for further
relief, asked that the period in which it could apply for such relief be extended. The sought-for extension was for five years in
Alcoa and for two in the ICI case. The court in each case denied
the government's petition.45 In denying the ICI extension, Judge
Ryan concluded his opinion by saying, "An open end judgment
would not aid competition, but rather tends to stifle it and prevent research and development of new or improved products."
In the Alcoa case, Judge Cashin held that the purpose of the
five-year period "was to observe Kaiser's and Reynolds' progress,
or lack of it." He found that during that period, Alcoa's relative
share of the aluminum market had declined while Kaiser's had increased and Reynolds' remained the same.46 He concluded:
". . . Kaiser and Reynolds have not only thrived and prospered
but they have removed all reasonable doubts as to their capacity
to effectively compete with Alcoa in the future." 47
If the court in either of these two cases intended to permit
the government to request it to reappraise the decrees in these
two hard-fought cases, it would seem that Judge Wyzanski's
"C Day" provision would have been a preferable formulation
for achieving that result. The "C Day" provision contains two
vital differences: the length of time for reappraisal is more than
doubled to twelve years from the date of the court's formulation
of the judgment and both sides are given the chance to petition
for important modifications.48
In consent decrees, provisions giving the government the right
to further relief are likely to prove little more than empty threats.
Consider the position of a court in a petition to modify a consent
judgment where the petition seeks the drastic relief of divorce-

44 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at
419; United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215.
45 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 132;
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1957) CCH 1957 Trade Cas.
1[68,859.
46 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 132 at 167.
47 Id. at 171.
48 In the ICI case, the judgment apparently did give both sides an opportunity to
petition for changes in the decree, although the language giving the defendants this opportunity is no more explicit than that in the standard retention-of-jurisdiction clause.
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ment or dissolution of a putative monopolist. There is no record
to which the court can turn. One must be created for him as a
result of hearings. The judge did not fashion the original decree.
This was done by consent of the parties. His knowledge of it is
confined, at most, to having had it explained to him at the time
of its entry, just before he signed it.
While a consent decree is not a private contract, as we have
learned above, it is a settlement of litigation and as such has
some of the attributes of accord and satisfaction. Courts are apt
to be extremely reluctant, no matter how explicit is the privilege
of either party to reopen, to grant additional relief to the government.
·
For much the same reason, provisions analogous to Judge
Wyzanski's "C Day" are not apt to prove effective in consent decrees. If either party moves for modification, it is likely that the
other party will counter with a petition for modification_ in the
opposite direction. In this circumstance a court is likely to deny
both.
The government is not altogether helpless if its demands for
further relief are not met. It is usually open to it to institute a
new civil case alleging that defendant is presently violating the
Sherman Act. And in fact on several occasions the government
has filed new suits against defendants already subject to extensive
restrictions in consent decrees covering practices in the same
markets as those involved in the first suits.49 In the second case,
however, the government may be prevented from introducing
evidence of events occurring prior to the entry of the first judgment.150 And in at least one such instance the attorney general has
stated that this prevented the government from successfully
prosecuting the second case. Curiously enough, this occurred in

49 302 U.S. 230 (1937); United States v. General Electric Co., CCH, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRusr LAws, p. 86, #82 and p. 240, #575 (1952); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, id. at 96, #116, and 175, #423; United States v. Central-West Publishing Co.,
id. at 97, #119, and 420, #1105 (sub nom. United States v. Western Newspaper Union);
United States v. Swift & Co., id. at 118, #211 (sub nom. United States v. Armour and
Co.) and 374, #944; United States v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., id. at 152, #346,
and 406, #1058; United States v. Radio Corp. of America, id. at 158, #371, and 147,
#1210 (1952-1956 Supp.); United States v. Textile Refinishers Assn., id. at 172, #414, and
420, #1106; United States v. Borden Co., id. at 233, #556, and 415, #1090; United States
v. American Society of Composers, id. at 247, #593, and 355, #896.
50 Orders (unreported) to this effect were entered in the second cases against Armour
& Co., General Outdoor Advertising Co., and Borden Co., cited in the preceding note.
All of these cases arose in the Northern District of Illinois.
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the meat industry. In 1948-sixteen years after defendants lost
in their effort to modify the 1920 decree-the government filed a
second broad equity suit against the American Meat Institute
and four of the five defendants in the 1920 case, alleging monopolization in meat extending back to 1905.51 On defendants'
motion, the district court entered an order preventing the government from introducing any testimony as to matters occurring
prior to April 2, 1930, the date on which Armour and Swift had
filed their amended petitions to modify the 1920 decree.52 On the
eve of trial in 1954, the government dismissed the 1948 complaint
on the ground that order limiting proof made it impossible for
the government to proceed to try the case.53
In the case of RCA, the government filed a second suit in
1954 which is pending. 54 The complaint carefully limits the allegations of illegal activities to a time subsequent to the filing of the
first consent decree. The matter first reached the courts as a result of a grand jury investigation instituted in 1952, ten years
after Judge Maris denied the government's petition to vacate the
1932 consent decree. When subpoenaed to produce its records
before the grand jury, RCA pleaded the consent decree as a bar
to the subpoena.55 Judge Weinfeld refused to quash it and held
that the consent decree did not bar subsequent grand jury investigation. The subpoena, however, called for no records dated
earlier than 1934, somewhat more than a year after the entry of
the consent decree.
The principal benefit which a defendant obtains from a consent decree is, of course, that the litigation is ended. As Judge
Maris put it in the RCA case, defendant may set up the decree "as
a bar to any attempt by the Government to relitigate the issues
raised in the suit" or to seek additional relief. 56 Suppose a defendant's conduct fifteen or twenty years after the entry of a decree has
neither violated the decree nor the antitrust laws, and suppose

51 See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, p. 374, #944 (1952).
52 See p. 52 of Brief cited in note 14 supra.
53 Id., Exhibit Y. (Press release, Dept. of Justice, dated March 17, 1954). In 1956
defendants Swift, Armour and Cudahy filed new motions to modify the 1920 consent
decree. They also moved to transfer the case from the District of Columbia to the
Northern District of Illinois. The motion has been granted. United States v. Swift and
Co., (D.C. D.C. 1958) 158 F. Supp. 551.
54 See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws-1952-1956 Supp., p. 147, #1210 (1957).
55Application of Radio Corporation of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 13 F.R.D. 167.
56 Quoted at note 33 supra.
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further that the decree no longer serves any useful purpose. In
the existing state of the law, it is extremely doubtful if either side
could vacate it if the other side objected.
This problem is doubtless not serious when related to the majority of antitrust consent judgments. Most of them lose "practical significance with the passage of ... time." 57 But consent decrees rendered in important monopoly cases [National Cash Register (1916); 58 International Harvester (1918); 59 the Meat Packers
(1920); 60 R.C.A. (1932); 61 Ford62 and Chrysler (1938); 68 LibbeyOwens-Ford (1948); 04 Eastman Kodak (1954); 65 International
Business Machines (1956) 66-to cite some leading examples] continue to hang over the defendants and the public with no real reexamination as the years go by to determine their present effectiveness or their appropriateness.
Forty years ago it seemed proper and wise to limit the Harvester Company to only one dealer in agricultural implements in
any one city. 67 This may or may not be a wise restraint today.
Thirty-eight years ago, it was thought in the public interest to
prevent Cudahy Packing Company from selling meats and groceries at retail. 68 Is this wise in today's market place? Yet, in the
absence of a showing of grievous wrong resulting from changing
circumstances these provisions will continue, apparently forever.
A consent judgment that has already been in effect for fifteen
or twenty years whose injunctions are still necessary has probably
been ineffective. Within that period the judgment should have accomplished its objectives. At the conclusion of tµat period both
the government and the defendants should reassess the competitive situation in the market or markets involved, and unless the
conclusions are clear both that an injunction is still necessary to
compel obedience to law and maintain competition and that the
judgment has and will continue to serve that purpose, the judg-

57 See Tobin v. Alma Mills, (4th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 133 at 136.
58 See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, p. 91, #100 (1952).
59 See text at note 34 supra.
60 See text at note 16 supra.
61 See text at note 32 supra.
62 See CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, p. 187, #439 (1952).
68 Id. at 186, #438.
64 See text at note 41 supra.
65 CCH 1954 TRADE CAs. 1[67,920.
66 CCH 1956 TRADE CAs. 1[68,245.
67 See pp. 1058-1059 supra.
68 See p. 1054 supra.
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ment should be terminated. Thus, there should be inserted in all
antitrust consent decrees a paragraph along the following lines:
"Fifteen [or twenty] years after the entry of this final judgment all of its provisions then in effect shall automatically
terminate against all defendants unless any party to the judgment shall have filed, within three months before the expiration of said fifteen [or twenty] year period, a petition to
continue in force any or all of said provisions. Said petition
shall state the reasons why it is deemed equitable and in the
public interest that said provisions, or any of them, be continued. Within sixty days after any such petition shall have
been filed each other party to the judgment shall file an answer thereto. After the filing of said answers, this court shall
hold a hearing at which any party may offer testimony and
other evidence on the merits of said petition or petitions.
Pending decision on said petition or petitions the provisions
in this final judgment sought to be continued by each such
petition shall continue in effect."
This suggested provision might not be sufficient to permit the
government, after a decree has been terminated pursuant to its
terms, successfully to attack the legality in any subsequent suit
against the same defendants of their activities. prior to the entry
of the first decree. 69 To insure that allegations of this type in new
suits against the same defendants would withstand defenses based
on a theory of estoppel, the proposed new paragraph might also
authorize dismissal of the first complaint if and when the judgment is terminated. In addition, the new paragraph should provide that the first judgment shall not bar granting appropriate
relief in any new case that may be filed by the government.70
Thus, an additional sentence could be added along the following
lines:

69 Cf. United States v. RCA, (D.C. Del. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 654, discussed in text
at note 32 supra; and cases cited note 41 supra. But cf. United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, (W.D. Pa. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 608, affd. 302 U.S. 230 (1937).
70 A provision along these lines is contained in art. IX of the consent judgment in
United States v. International Nickel Co. of Canada,. Ltd., (S.D. N.Y. 1948) CCH 1948-1949
TRADE CAS. 1[62,280.
Section XIII of the Consent Judgment in the United Fruit case provides that twenty
years after defendant "has completed performance of the plan for disposition of assets
described in Article VIII," the judgment "shall thereafter be of no force or effect."
United States v. United Fruit Co., (E.D. La. 1958) 1958 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1[68,941.
Since art. VIII, §E, gives the defendant a period of not more than four years after June
30, 1966 to comply with a suitable divestiture plan, the 20-year period might not commence until 1970.
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"If this court determines that this final judgment shall be
terminated, it shall (or may) also enter an order dismissing
the complaint herein, without prejudice, in which event, in
any new proceeding instituted by the plaintiff under the
Sherman Act after the entry of any such order of dismissal,
this judgment shall not be deemed a bar to the granting of
appropriate relief or the interposition of any defense other
than that such relief is barred by this judgment."
If dismissal of the original complaint is left to the discretion

of the court, rather than made mandatory, there is good reason
to suppose that the entire paragraph would be acceptable to
many defendants for inclusion in consent decrees hereafter entered. The proposal should also have appeal for the Antitrust
Division. In drafting and negotiating consent decrees, the Antitrust Division is not in the position solely of a litigant in a law
suit; rather it must necessarily assume many of the attributes of
an administrative tribunal. In many cases, while occupying this
role, the division is purporting to draft what will become an industry code of lawful competition. As such it necessarily has a
greater responsibility than if it were proposing a final judgment
for consideration by an impartial court after a full trial. Indeed,
in negotiating consent decrees the division must perforce assume
-if only for the moment-a kind of judicial role.
Viewed in this light, the Antitrust Division, as well as defendants and the public, should gain by agreeing upon automatic
termination of consent judgments after they have been in effect
for a long period of years unless there is some clear reason in a
particular case for continuing any of their provisions.

